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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Drug prices are too high.”1 
      †    Dr. Seth Whitelaw is President and CEO of the Whitelaw Compliance 
Group, Editor of the Life Science Compliance Update, and Senior Fellow and 
Adjunct Professor of Life Sciences Compliance at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
      ††   Nicodemo Fiorentino, Esq. is a regulatory and compliance advisor to the 
pharmaceutical and medical device industries and a Board Member of the Life 
Science Compliance Update. 
      †††   Jennifer O’Leary is a graduate from Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 
specializing in Health Law Compliance, and a Managing Editor of the Mitchell 
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44. The views expressed in this article are solely those of 
the authors and not necessarily their affiliated organizations. 
1. See Rachel Roubein, HHS Nominee: Prescription Drug Prices Too High, THE 
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With these five simple words, Alex Azar II, former president of 
Lilly USA LLC, and now the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) Secretary, captured the essence of the drug pricing 
war.2 It is a conflict that pits the pharmaceutical companies against 
doctors, hospitals, insurers, regulators, and consumers.3 The 
pharmaceutical industry has fought this war for over two decades,4 
but inevitably, it will lose because both facts and public opinion 
weigh in favor changing the status quo.5 In this industry, life science 
HILL (Nov. 29, 2017, 10:46 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/362325-
hhs-nominee-prescription-drug-prices-too-high [https://perma.cc/S443-C6FN] 
(quoting the opening statement of Alex Azar before the Senate Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions Committee). 
2. Id.
3. See Toon van der Gronde et al., Addressing the Challenge of High-Priced
Prescription Drugs in the Era of Precision Medicine: A Systematic Review of Drug Life Cycles, 
Therapeutic Drug Markets and Regulatory Frameworks, 12 PLOS ONE 2 (Aug. 16,
2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5559086/pdf/pone.0182 
613.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GXQ-RGTE] (discussing the need for pharmaceutical 
“regulatory reform to curtail prices and safeguard equitable access to innovative 
medicines”); David Ferry, The New War on (Overpriced) Drugs, WIRED (June 10, 2017, 
10:06 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/fighting-high-drug-prices/ [https:// 
perma.cc/S9MX-7CKN] (analyzing the conflict between drug pricing 
stakeholders); Carolyn Y. Johnson, Pharma, Under Attack for Drug Prices, Started an 
Industry War, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/business/economy/pharma-under-attack-for-drug-prices-started-an-industryw 
ar/2017/12/29/800a3de8-e5bc-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f097e_story.html?utm_term=.7 
e3efc2d94f7 [https: //perma.cc/3T3G-FGNA] (analyzing public outcry, academic 
analysis, political concerns, and the battle between insurers and drug companies). 
4. Compare Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Why We Pay So Much for Drugs,
CNN (Jan. 27, 2004, 5:57PM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/27/ 
timep.drugs.tm/ [https://perma.cc/E2EC-7LPA] (chronicling public outcry amid 
the 2004 presidential campaign regarding high priced drugs and the cozy 
relationship between the FDA and pharmaceutical companies), and Richard G. 
Frank, The Ongoing Regulation of Generic Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1993, 1995 (Nov.
15, 2007), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp078193 [https:// 
perma.cc/D9 6W-JWCS] (discussing tactics pharmaceutical companies engage in 
when subverting public policy goals of lower prices), with Ferry, supra note 3 
(analyzing the modern conflict between drug pricing stakeholders), and Jill Disis, 
Lawmakers Say EpiPen Hikes Made Executives ‘Filthy Rich’, CNN MONEY (Sept. 22, 2016, 
8:22 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/21/news/companies/mylan-epipen-
house-oversight-committee/ [https://perma.cc/8KFH-QX8V] (chronicling the 
ongoing public policy battle for cheaper drugs between pharmaceutical companies 
and lawmakers). 
5. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Big Price Increase for Tuberculosis Drug is
Rescinded, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/ 
2
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compliance officers have prepared for the confrontation for over 
twenty years. In this time, these officers have become vetted with 
unique knowledge and experience that will benefit all stakeholders. 
This is their Waterloo. 
The article will first discuss the pattern of prescription drug 
price increases from major pharmaceutical companies, the 
complexities of prescription drug pricing, and political responses to 
recent major cases involving drug pricing.6 This is followed by a 
review of legislative solutions aimed to fix prescription drug price 
increases.7 Finally, the article concludes by recommending tools that 
compliance officers can use to help regulate the price of 
pharmaceutical drugs.8 
II. HOW DID IT GET THIS BAD?
As with most issues, the current drug pricing situation did not 
occur overnight. Rather, it progressed over many years.9 For 
example, since 2013, the prices of many generic drugs rose sharply; 
in some cases by as much as 600% to 1,000%.10 Over much of the 
past two decades, opinion polls and surveys have consistently shown 
that pharmaceutical companies are held in low esteem, on par with 
oil and gas companies.11 The perceived arrogance of the industry has 
business/big-price-increase-for-tb-drug-is-rescinded.html [https://perma.cc/Y4GS-
M4NP] (documenting public outcry causing a change in pricing by a 
pharmaceutical company). But see Max Nisen, Opinion, Why Pharma May Not Fear the 
Latest Drug-Price Probe, BLOOMBERG GADFLY (Aug. 18, 2017, 10:03 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-08-18/biogen-and-pharma-ma 
y-not-fear-multiple-sclerosis-drug-price-probe [https://perma.cc/573Z-8EA7] 
(arguing that public outcry will not change the pharmaceutical industry’s pricing 
practices). 
6. See discussion infra Section II.
7. See discussion infra Section III.
8. See discussion infra Section IV.
9. See generally Alex Kacik, Drug Prices Rise as Pharma Profit Soars, MOD. 
HEALTHCARE (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/ 
20171228/NEWS/171229930 [https://perma.cc/FT7P-7F6M] (detailing the rise of 
prescription drug prices). 
10. See Generic Drug Price Spikes Demand Congressional Hearing, Pharmacists Say,
NCPA (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.ncpanet.org/newsroom/news-releases---
2017/2014/01/08/generic-drug-price-spikes-demand-congressional-hearing-phar 
macists-say [https://perma.cc/L4M3-3C4S] (citing a survey of members).  
11. See, e.g., Jim Norman, Americans’ Views of Pharmaceutical Industry Take a
Tumble, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185432/americans-
views-pharmaceutical-industry-tumble.aspx?g_source=pharmaceutical+industry&g_ 
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only served to strengthen the negative perceptions.12 When coupled 
with rising healthcare costs that many people attribute to high drug 
prices,13 the result is a rallying cry that American politicians find 
irresistible.14 “A greater degree of government oversight is needed to 
defend public health” because the pharmaceutical industry is 
“controlled by economic managers who regard medicine simply as a 
business and who ignore human needs and responsibilities.”15 
medium=search&g_campaign=tiles [https://perma.cc/XF9E-667T]. 
12. See, e.g., JAGDISH N. SHETH, THE SELF-DESTRUCTIVE HABITS OF GOOD
COMPANIES: …AND HOW TO BREAK THEM (Wharton Sch. Publ’g ed., 1st ed. 2007) 
(discussing Merck); Brian Mahany, Big Pharma and Corporate Arrogance—Baxter 
International, MAHANY L. (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.mahanyertl.com/2015/big-
pharma-corporate-arrogance/ [https://perma.cc/U4F8-4RKE] (discussing Baxter 
International and the 2007 heparin scandal that ended in tragedy). 
13. See, e.g., Blaire Briody, Medicaid’s Ticking Bomb Could Wipe Out State
Budgets, FISCAL TIMES (June 23, 2010), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/ 
2010/06/23/Medicaid-Ticking-Time-Bomb-Could-Wipe-Out-State-Budgets [https: 
//perma.cc/JQ2E-WPBD] (“Medicaid costs as a percentage of state budgets will 
nearly double by 2030, from the current 20 percent to 35 percent in some states.”); 
Norman, supra note 11 (“[Seventy-three percent] of Americans said they considered 
the high cost of prescription drugs an important reason for rising healthcare 
costs.”). 
14. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 680 (2011). 
“Catastrophes are probably the most important catalysts of new 
regulation.” Legislators in our media-oriented world “transform 
individual acts of malfeasance into social problems requiring society-
wide solutions.” Legislators write prohibitory legislation, which places 
them “on the side of the angels without having to vote for higher taxes.” 
Once regulatory bureaucracies are established, their growth is 
determined in part by failure of current policy, and in part by new risks 
and new situations that develop. Noteworthy events spark that growth, 
including “scandals that expose presumptive laxity, corruption, or 
incompetency in the regulatory agency.”  
EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF 
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 23 (Transaction Pubs. 2d prtg. 2003). 
15. See Lawrence Grouse, Physicians for Sale: How Medical Professional
Organizations Exploit Their Members, 10 MEDSCAPE J. MED. 169 (2008); see also Timothy 
S. Jost, Oversight of Marketing Relationships Between Physicians and the Drug and Device 
Industry: A Comparative Study, 36 AM. J. L. & MED. 326, 330 (2010), (describing the 
“troubling relationships between [drug and medical device] manufacturers and 
[medical] professionals” through a business marketing framework). 
4
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss4/2
  
2018] THE WAR ON DRUG PRICING 1169 
A. Pattern of Prescription Drug Price Increases 
A pattern of price increases can be seen across the 
pharmaceutical industry. For example, the drug Daranide was 
originally approved in 1958 to treat glaucoma and is now used to 
treat a rare illness called periodic paralysis.16 Over the past seventeen 
years, the price of the drug has ranged from $0 to more than $13,000 
for 100 pills.17 
The behavior of some pharmaceutical companies and their 
executives demonstrates the pricing problem.18 For example, former 
hedge fund manager Martin Shkreli organized Turing 
Pharmaceuticals (“Turing”) with the specific purpose to acquire and 
raise the price of older drugs.19 In late August 2015, Turing procured 
the drug Daraprim from Impax Pharmaceuticals for $55 million and 
raised the price of the drug from $13.50 to $750—a 5,455% 
increase.20  In the midst of the outrage over Turing’s actions, 
Shkreli declared that the drug was priced where the company 
“could make a comfortable profit,” and “that he had no plans to 
16. Carolyn Y. Johnson, At One Time This Drug Was Free. Now, 100 Pills Are




18. See, e.g., James Hamblin, Pharma Bro Is the Face of U.S. Health Care, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/09/martin-
shkreli-in-the-mirror/406888/ [https://perma.cc/B7X8-K2BF]; Matthew Herper, 
Why Did that Drug Price Increase 6,000%? It’s the Law, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2017, 1:52 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2017/02/10/a-6000-price-hike-sho 
uld-give-drug-companies-a-disgusting-sense-of-deja-vu/#5d4997e471f5 [https://pe 
rma.cc/SH27-GBYJ]; Carolyn Y. Johnson, This Old Drug Was Free. Now It’s $109,500 
a Year, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2017/12/18/this-old-drug-was-free-now-its-109500-a-year/?utm_term=.1 
cc1a947d580 [https://perma.cc/E82D-CD8B]; Kelefa Sanneh, Everyone Hates 
Martin Shkreli. Everyone Is Missing the Point, NEW YORKER (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/everyone-hates-martin-sh 
kreli-everyone-is-missing-the-point [https://perma.cc/893E-JZ6G]. 
19. See Laura Lorezetti, This 62-Year-Old Drug Just Got 5,000% More
Expensive, FORTUNE (Sept. 21, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/21/turing-
pharmaceuticals-drug-prices-daraprim/ [https://perma.cc/35N5-8KTU]; Luke 
Timmerman, A Timeline of the Turing Pharma Controversy, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/luketimmerman/2015/09/23/a-timeline-of-the-tu 
ring-pharma-controversy/#44a84d72771d [https://perma.cc/HXH9-UNVU]. 
20. See Lorezetti, supra note 19; see also Timmerman, supra note 19.
5
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lower [the price].”21 Simultaneously, Hillary Clinton tweeted 
from the campaign trail that, “[p]rice gouging like this in the 
specialty drug market is outrageous. Tomorrow, I’ll lay out a plan to 
take it on.”22  
The public backlash caught the attention of Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals and its CEO Mike Pearson, who pursued a quiet 
strategy similar to Turing.23 Pearson’s plan leveraged the 
company to purchase small but established drug makers.24 He 
raised prices and slashed non-essential components, including 
research and development.25 After the Clinton tweet, Valeant 
shares fell in value by 20%.26 During the subsequent months, 
information surfaced about the misstatement of financial results 
and Valeant’s uniquely cozy arrangement with specialty 
pharmacy, Philidor,27 which led to allegations that the company’s 
real success resulted from a combination of price gouging, a secret 
network of specialty pharmacies, and fraud.28 These accusations 
sent Valeant stock into a free fall and caused Pearson’s 
21. Interview by Meg Tirrell with Martin Shkreli, CEO, Turing Pharms., CNBC
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2015/09/21/turing-ceo-drug-
priced-where-we-could-make-comfortable-profit.html [https://perma.cc/6JLV-
7B9R]. 
22. See Matt Egan, Hillary Clinton Tweet Crushes Biotech Stocks, CNN MONEY (Sept.
21, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/21/investing/hillary-clinton-biotech-
price-gouging/?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/8CZG-KS2D]. 
23. See Lydia Ramsey & Andy Kiersz, Here’s Former Stock Market Darling
Valeant Crashing in One Chart, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 13, 2015, 9:24 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-have-valeant-pharmaceuticals-shares-
collapsed-2015-11 [https://perma.cc/MG2Q-KYDW]; Ed Silverman & Jonathan 
Rockoff, Pharmaceutical Companies Buy Rivals’ Drugs, Then Jack Up the Prices, 
WALL STREET J. (Apr. 26, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pharmaceutical-
companies-buy-rivals-drugs-then-jack-up-the-prices-1430096431 [https://perma.cc/ 
7R6K-D3WM]. 
24. See Silverman & Rockoff, supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Bob Bryan & Linette Lopez, The Disastrous Valeant Document Everyone’s
Been Waiting for is Finally Here, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2016, 7:42 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/valeants-annual-report-is-finally-out-2016-4 [htt 
ps://perma.cc/PQ57-MJEK]. 
28. See Kaitlin Wildoner, Valeant and Philidor Controversy Comes to a Head, 3.2 LIFE 
SCI. COMPLIANCE UPDATE 16–19 (2017). 
6
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resignation.29 Between August 2015 and January 2016, the 
company’s value declined by 29.6%.30 
The cascading events began for Mylan Pharmaceuticals 
(“Mylan”) in 2016, when it raised the price of the EpiPen from about 
$103.50 to $608.61.31 Facing a tidal wave of criticism, Mylan pivoted 
and announced the launch of a generic EpiPen that cost half the 
branded product price, but still three times the 2009 price.32 In 
response, Sarah Jessica Parker resigned as the company’s 
spokesperson and stated she was “disappointed, saddened and 
deeply concerned by Mylan’s actions.”33 The New York Attorney 
General evinced its concern by launching an antitrust investigation, 
and Congress called for hearings to consider Mylan’s actions 
regarding the EpiPen.34 Even Martin Shkreli weighed in, saying 
29. Id.
30. Brian Feroldi, Why Valeant Pharmaceuticals Intl. Inc. Crashed in 2015, 
MOTLEYFOOL.COM (Jan. 8, 2016, 4:59 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/ 
general/2016/01/08/why-valeant-pharmaceuticls-crashed-in-2015.aspx [https:// 
perm a.cc/VXG2-RLZ9]. 
31. Mylan CEO on EpiPen Drug Price Controversy: “I get the Outrage,”
CBS  NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017, 6:54 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/epipen-price-
hike-controversy-mylan-ceo-heather-bresch-speaks-out/ [https://perma.cc/GK7H-
HUXS]; see also Cynthia Koons & Robert Langreth, How Marketing Turned the EpiPen 
Into a Billion-Dollar Business, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-23/how-marketing-turned-th 
e-epipen-into-a-billion-dollar-business [https://perma.cc/W32L-WEKM] (stating 
how Mylan’s marketing and lobbying efforts facilitated EpiPen price increases). 
32. Press Release, Mylan, Mylan Launches the First Generic for EpiPen
(epinephrine injection, USP) Auto-Injector as an Authorized Generic (Dec. 16, 
2016), http://newsroom.mylan.com/2016-12-16-Mylan-Launches-the-First-Generic 
-for-EpiPen-epinephrine-injection-USP-Auto-Injector-as-an-Authorized-Generic   [h 
ttps://perma.cc/TS9E-JSGM]; see also Charles Duhigg, Outcry Over EpiPen Prices 
Hasn’t Made Them Lower, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/06/04/business/angry-about-epipen-prices-executive-dont-care-much. 
html [https://perma.cc/9C5S-QHNG] (explaining that the price of the generic 
version was still $370). 
33. See Jenna Amatulli, Sarah Jessica Parker Ends Mylan Partnership Over




34. Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman
Launches Antitrust Investigation into Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Maker of EpiPen 
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“[t]hey had one product, and they finally started making a little bit 
of money and everyone is going crazy over it.”35 
Mylan also came under scrutiny for allegations that it teamed 
with prominent activists to have EpiPen added to the federal list of 
preventative medical services.36 In 2016, the company contributed 
$227,500 towards lobbying efforts aimed at garnering the listing.37 
The next year  Mylan reached an agreement with the United States 
Department of Justice to pay $465 million to settle a lawsuit, alleging 
that the company violated the False Claims Act.38 Under the terms 
of the settlement, Mylan admitted to “knowingly misclassifying 
EpiPen as a generic drug to avoid paying rebates owed primarily to 
Medicaid.”39 
B. Complications of Drug Pricing
The pharmaceutical drug pricing system is a labyrinth of pricing 
mechanisms that ultimately leads to conflict. “Behind the seemingly 
simple act of buying a bottle of pills, a host of players—drug 
companies, pharmacies, insurers and pharmacy benefit managers—
are taking a cut of the profits, even as consumers are left to fend for 
themselves, critics say.”40 A 2016 study exposed just how complicated 
drug pricing is, revealing that “[a]lthough price growth for 
protected brands was 12.4% on an invoice price basis, net price 
growth is estimated to have increased 2.8% in 2015 on average.”41 
35. Vinita Nair, Ex-Pharma CEO Martin Shkreli Weighs in On Skyrocketing EpiPen
Prices, CBS NEWS (Aug 23, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ex-pharma-ceo-
martin-shkreli-weighs-in-on-skyrocketing-epipen-prices/ [https://perma.cc/8J4P-
UMBP]. 
36. Eric Lipton & Rachel Abrams, EpiPen Maker Lobbies to Shift High Costs to
Others, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016). 
37. Id. In 2016, Mylan made a total of $1.8 million in total donations. Id.
38. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Mylan Agrees to Pay
$465 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Liability for Underpaying EpiPen Rebates 




40. Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, When Buying Prescription Drugs, Some Pay
More with Insurance Than Without It, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 9, 2017, 12:01 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/when-buying-prescription-drugs-some-pay-mo 
re-with-insurance-than-without-it [https://perma.cc/LBX5-CWJH]. 
41. See IMS INST. FOR INFORMATICS, MEDICINES USE & SPENDING IN THE U.S.: A 
REVIEW OF 2015 & OUTLOOK TO 2020, 8 (2016), https://morningconsult.com/wp-
8
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Moreover, the study noted that the invoice versus net price spread 
“reflects higher levels of off-invoice discounts, price protection, 
rebates and price concessions since 2013.”42  
A recent study from the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine makes similar observations on the 
complexities of drug pricing.43 The consensus report concluded that 
“[t]he relevant data needed to conclusively analyze this system do 
not exist at present, and, . . . some of the participants . . . argue that 
revealing their transactions would actually increase the drug prices 
paid by patients.”44 As a result, each side blames the other. 
C. Political Responses
The Turing, Valeant, and Mylan cases have generated a 
predictable backlash and a flurry of activity by politicians. In 2017, 
United States Senators started pressing the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate potential abuses of the 
Orphan Drug Act,45 and President Trump demanded that the 
“artificially high price of drugs” be brought down “immediately.”46 
In both the House and Senate, Democrats presented the Improving 
Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, but the bills have yet to 




43. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE:
A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 62 (Norman R. Augustine, Guru Madhavan, & Sharyl J. 
Nass, eds., 2017) [hereinafter MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE]. 
44. Id. at 60. Contra Ornstein & Thomas, supra note 40 (“[P]eople are shocked
to discover they can sometimes get better deals than their own insurers.”). 
45. Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Three Key Senators Ask GAO to
Investigate Possible Abuses of the Orphan Drug Act, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 7, 2017), 
http://khn.org/news/three-key-senators-ask-gao-to-investigate-possible-abuses-of-
the-orphan-drug-act/. [https://perma.cc/3ZBZ-WUUF]. The GAO is an 
independent agency under the United States Congress.  
46. 163 CONG. REC. H1388 (Feb. 28, 2017) (message of President Trump),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2017-02-28/pdf/CREC-2017-02-28-
pt1-PgH1386-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGT4-S687]; see also Thomas Sullivan, 
President Trump Meets with Democrats on Drug Prices, POL’Y & MED. (Apr. 13, 2017, 5:05 
AM), http://www.policymed.com/2017/04/president-trump-meets-with-democ 
rats-on-drug-prices.html [https://perma.cc/WN6A-JZJ6] (discussing the meeting 
between President Trump, several Democratic lawmakers, HHS Secretary Tom 
Price, and others regarding rising drug prices). 
47. Improving Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, H.R. 1776, 115th
9
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In 2018, the debate continues as pharmaceutical companies 
forge ahead, increasing the costs of drugs.48 Examples of the 
ongoing pricing behavior include Allergan PLC’s attempt to transfer 
a patent to the Saint Regis Mohawk tribe (to take advantage of the 
group’s status as a sovereign nation),49 and Avondale 
Pharmaceutical’s 800% price hike for a daily vitamin.50 In reaction 
to the increases, states such as California, Louisiana, New York, and 
Nevada have successfully enacted price transparency laws, while 
Maryland has enacted an anti-price gouging law with a cost 
disclosure component.51 With the exception of Louisiana and New 
York, the industry’s trade groups continue to lobby against these 
regulatory measures.52 One recent success for the lobbyists include 
Cong. (2017); Improving Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, S. 771, 115th 
Cong. (2017); Zachary Brennan, Democrats Propose Wide-Ranging Bill to 
Lower Drug Costs, RAPS (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-
Focus/News/2017/03/30/27223/Democrats-Propose-Wide-Ranging-Bill-to-Lower-
Drug-Costs/#sthash.xT7h7S3e.dpuf. [https://perma.cc/4JHH-DN37].  
48. Katie Thomas & Reed Abelson, Lower Drug Prices: New Proposals Carry Lots
of Promises, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/ 
09/health/trump-drug-prices-medicare.html [https://perma.cc/SF82-CQMA].  
49. Joe Mullin, Judge Throws Out Allergan Patent, Slams Company’s Native American
Deal, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 16, 2017, 7:16 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2017/10/judge-throws-out-allergan-patent-slams-companys-native-american 
-de al/ [https://perma.cc/AB4G-73VV]; Meg Tirrell, More Scrutiny for Allergan 
Over Native American Tribe Deal, CNBC (Oct. 2, 2017, 7:35 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/02/more-scrutiny-for-allergan-over-native-americ 
an-tribe-deal.html [http s://perma.cc/U2X9-48TF]. 
50. Jennings Brown, A Pharma Company Raised the Price of a Daily Vitamin by 800
Percent, GIZMODO (Dec. 12, 2017, 12:15 PM), https://gizmodo.com/a-pharma-
company-raised-the-price-of-a-daily-vitamin-by-1821217649 [https://perma.cc/EN 
9P-L4VT]. 
51. See Alan M. Kirschenbaum & David C. Gibbons, 2017: A Banner Year for State
Laws on Drug Pricing, Price Reporting, and Discounting, FDA L. BLOG (Nov. 2, 2017), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/2017/11/2017-a-banner-year-for-state-laws-on-drug-pr 
icing-price-reporting-and-discounting/ [https://perma.cc/56PD-EBNF]. 
52. See Alan M. Kirschenbaum & David C. Gibbons, Another State Drug Pricing 
Law . . . Another Legal Challenge; Trade Group Sues California in Latest Lawsuit Against  
Drug Pricing Transparency Bill, FDA L. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2017), http://www.fdalaw 
blog.net/2017/12/another-state-drug-pricing-law-another-legal-challenge-trade-gr 
oup-sues-california-in-latest-lawsuit-against-drug-pricing-transparency-bill/ [https: 
//perma.cc/P9LN-BPA4]; Stephen Bartlett, Trade Organizations Challenge Nevada’s 
Drug Price Transparency Law, DRUG PRICING POL’Y WATCH (Sept. 19, 2017), 
http://www.drugpricingpolicywatch.com/2017/09/19/trade-organizations-challe 
nge-nevadas-drug-price-transparency-law/ [https://perma.cc/7DAK-2QXS]; Erin 
Cox, Drug Firms Challenge Maryland Price-Gouging Law, BALT. SUN (July 6, 2017, 8:16 
10
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the defeat of a Ohio ballot measure designed to allow the state to 
renegotiate drug prices.53 Nevertheless, legislatures are beginning to 
enact measures to increase drug pricing transparency that will likely 
reveal that pricing decisions are neither rational nor methodical. 
Further, the United States Senate hearings on Gilead’s pricing 
decision for Solvadi have already provided a glimpse behind the 
curtain.54 Similar legislative efforts will likely continue to expose 
pricing methods contrary to public policy, which will leave the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers fighting a rearguard action against a 
tidal wave of regulatory efforts. Ultimately, the legislators, payers, 
and public will prevail in their effort to stabilize and reduce the price 
of prescription drugs. 
III. THE APPROACH OF THE STATES AND LOCALITIES
A. The Advocates Behind a Legislative Solution
“86% of Americans support actions requiring drug companies to release 
information to the public on the process of setting drug prices”55 
PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-price-goug 
ing-suit-20170706-story.html [https://perma.cc/G35K-E7SH]; Kevin Schweers, 
MYTH/FACT on PBM Arguments Against Bipartisan MAC Legislation, NAT’L
COMMUNITY PHARMACISTS ASS’N: THE DOSE (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.ncpanet. 
org/newsroom/ncpa's-blog---the-dose/2017/03/13/myth-fact-on-pbm-arguments-
against-bipartisan-mac-legislation [https://perma.cc/83MB-J8XH]. 
53. See Drug Companies Spend $57M to Defeat Ohio Ballot Issue, U.S. NEWS (Dec.
16, 2017, 2:26 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/ohio/articles/ 
2017-12-16/drug-companies-spend-57m-to-defeat-ohio-ballot-issue [https:// perm 
a.cc/HDH7-FKCB]; Casey Ross, Ohio Voters Reject Measure to Rein in Drug Costs, STAT
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/11/07/ohio-drug-costs-ballot/ 
[https://perma.cc/3DXV-8HNC]. 
54. See generally S. COMM. ON FIN., 114TH CONG., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (Comm. Print 2015) (discussing the 
negative impacts of Sovaldi’s pricing decisions). 
55. See Aaron Berman et al., Curbing Unfair Drug Prices: A Primer for States,
GLOBAL HEALTH JUST. PARTNERSHIP OF THE YALE L. SCH. & YALE SCH. PUB. HEALTH 1, 
7 (2017), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/curb 
ing_unfair_drug_prices-policy_paper-080717.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YUR-9Z4N] 
(citing Ashley Kirzinger et al., Kaiser Health Tracking Poll—Late April 2017: The Future 
of the ACA and Health Care & the Budget - Rx Drugs, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(2017)), https://www.kff.org/report-section/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-late-april-
2017-the-future-of-the-aca-and-health-care-the-budget-rx-drugs/ [https://perma.c 
c/YS97-4AAF]).   
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While there has been inaction at the federal level, there is a 
myriad of local initiatives and highly influential advocacy groups 
calling for transparency in drug pricing.56 This landscape includes 
some of the “most powerful trade organizations,”57 spending near 
record amounts to affect change amidst a multitude of failing state 
legislative bills,58 and new requirements that increase compliance 
risks at both the state and local level.59  
The National Coalition on Health Care (NCHC)60 and the 
Campaign for Sustainable Rx Pricing (CSRxP) are examples of 
affiliations that have provided aid to state legislatures with the goal 
of increasing transparency.61 The CSRxP is a “nonpartisan coalition 
of organizations informing the debate on drug pricing and finding 
bipartisan, market-based solutions to lower drug prices in the U.S.”62 
The CSRxP is not alone in its efforts with patient advocacy groups, 
56. See generally Prescription Drug State Database, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/prescription-drug-statenet-database.aspx [h 
ttps://perma.cc/QF87-PXW7] (last visited July 31, 2018) (discussing current 
initiatives for drug pricing transparency). 
57. Jay Hancock, Drug Industry Spent Millions to Squelch Talk About High Drug
Prices, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://khn.org/news/drug-industry-
spent-millions-to-squelch-talk-about-high-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/RVT7-
H9UZ]. For example, Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) is “one of 
the most powerful trade organizations in any industry” and is spending near record 
amounts on lobbying efforts. Id. 
58. See Nicodemo Fiorentino, Whack a Mole Pricing Bills Keep Popping Up
Everywhere, 3.5 LIFE SCI. COMPLIANCE UPDATE 1, 2 (2017). 
59. See, e.g., Thomas Sullivan, Chicago Proposes Drug Pricing Transparency
Ordinance, POL’Y & MED. (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.policymed.com/ 
2017/09/chicago-proposes-drug-pricing-transparency-ordinance.html [https:// 
perma.cc/W5XV-8UK6] (explaining a new drug pricing transparency ordinance 
and how, “if enacted, the proposal will likely have an effect on the bottom line of 
pharmaceutical companies”). 
60. About Us, NCHC, http://www.nchc.org/ [https://perma.cc/Y7U4-99X5]
(last visited July 31, 2018) (defining NCHC as a “nonpartisan, nonprofit 
organization of organizations” that “represents more than 80 participating 
organizations, including medical societies, businesses, unions, health care 
providers, faith-based associations, pension and health funds, insurers, and groups 
representing consumers, patients, women, minorities and persons with 
disabilities”). 
61. The Campaign, CSRXP, http://www.csrxp.org/about-the-campaign/
[https://perma.cc/26P2-TCLE] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
62. Our Mission, CSRXP, http://www.csrxp.org/about-the-campaign/ 
[https://perma.cc/26P2-TCLE] (last visited July 31, 2018); Who We Are, CSRXP, 
http://www.csrxp.org/about-the-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/26P2-TCLE] (last 
visited July 31, 2018). 
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such as Patients for Affordable Drugs,63 also lobbying legislatures for 
the same goal.64 As an example of recent success, Maryland’s 
consumer advocacy group, Maryland Citizens’ Health Initiative and 
its Health Care for All! Coalition65 actively contributed to Maryland 
enacting the first price gouging law in the nation.66  
Another highly influential group is the National Academy for 
State Health Policy (NASHP), which is an “independent academy of 
state health policymakers.”67 Through its Pharmacy Costs Work 
Group (PCWG), NASHP is comprised “of state leaders from 
governors’ staffs, state legislatures, Medicaid, public employees’ 
health insurance programs, offices of attorney generals, state-based 
insurance exchanges, comptrollers’ offices and corrections 
departments.”68 Funded by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation 
and Kaiser Permanente,69 the PCWG began its task of “look[ing] 
63. About Us, PATIENTS FOR AFFORDABLE DRUGS, https://www.patientsforafford
abledrugs.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/4266-E3AM] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
64. Solutions, PATIENTS FOR AFFORDABLE DRUGS, https://www.patientsforafford
abledrugs.org/solutions/ [https://perma.cc/G87Z-7UE5] (last visited July 31, 
2018). 
65. About, HEALTH CARE FOR ALL, http://healthcareforall.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/4HKT-THGK] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
66. Len Lucchi, How the Drug Industry Blew it in Md., BALTIMORE SUN (June 27,
2017, 10:40 A.M.), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-
0628-drug-industry-md-20170627-story.html [https://perma.cc/C9EL-7NNS].  
67. About NASHP, NASHP, https://nashp.org/about-nashp/ [https://perm
a.cc/3SVB-RNSN] (last visited July 31, 2018).
68. Pharmacy Costs Work Group, States and the Rising Cost of Pharmaceuticals: A
Call to Action, NASHP 1, 4 (Oct. 2016), https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/10/Rx-Paper.pdf. [https://perma.cc/P9AR-4GVD]; see also Trish Riley, 
NASHP Announces Pharmacy Costs Work Group, NASHP (May 10, 2016), 
https://nashp.org/nashp-announces-pharmacy-costs-work-group/ [https://perm 
a.cc/EFL2-K75V].
69. Center for State Rx Drug Pricing, NASHP, https://nashp.org/center-for-state-
drug-rx-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/6J6M-GXP8] (last visited July 31, 2018); Riley, 
supra note 68. The Laura and John Arnold Foundation also provided funds to 
NASHP to establish the Center for State Drug Price Action. Press Release, Laura & 
John Arnold Found., Laura and John Arnold Found. Announces $7.2 Million in 
Grants to Address the Rising Cost of Pharm. Drugs (Feb. 17, 2016), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/laura-and-john-arnold-foundation-announces-
7-2-million-in-grants-to-address-the-rising-cost-of-pharmaceutical-drugs/ [https:// 
perma.cc/AX2 Z-WJ39] (providing additional information related to other grants 
the foundation has given “for research and pilot projects aimed at addressing the 
rising cost of pharmaceutical drugs and reducing the financial barriers that can 
make it difficult to obtain life-saving treatments”). With the support of the Laura 
and John Arnold Foundation, NASHP has also awarded grants of its own to 
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beyond the strategies currently used in states to identify and develop 
new ideas which address the growing problem of Rx costs.”70 In 
October 2016, the PCWG issued a call to action to “[i]ncrease price 
transparency to create public visibility and accountability.”71 Part of 
this strategy included the following types of disclosure:  
(1) Drug development cost reporting, requiring justification of 
price increases; 
(2) Public disclosure of price discounts and rebates to states; 
and 
(3) Confidential disclosure of price discounts and rebates to 
states.72 
With PCWG’s guidance, NASHP developed a model 
transparency bill blueprint for states that would require 
manufacturers to disclose how a drug is priced and publish price 
justification documents obtained from manufacturers.73 
In August 2017, the Yale Global Health Justice Partnership 
(GHJP),74 in collaboration with the National Physicians Alliance 
(NPA)75 and the Universal Health Care Foundation of 
Colorado, Delaware, and Oklahoma to enable the states to study ways to address 
prescription drug pricing practices. Jennifer Reck, NASHP Awards Grants to Colorado, 
Delaware, and Oklahoma to Tackle Rising Rx Drug Prices, NASHP (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://nashp.org/nashp-awards-grants-to-colorado-delaware-and-oklahoma-to-ta 
ckle-rising-rx-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/ARJ5-FYE3].  
70. Riley, supra note 68.
71. Pharmacy Costs Work Group, State Leaders Offer Solutions to Address
Rapid Increase in Prescription Drug Spending, NASHP (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://nashp.org/state-leaders-offer-solutions-to-address-rapid-increase-in-prescri 
ption-drug-spending/ [https://perma.cc/X5TF-NVD4].  
72. Id.
73. Jane Horvath et al., NASHP Releases Model Rx Transparency Legislation,
NASHP (Mar. 7, 2017), https://nashp.org/nashp-releases-model-rx-transparency-
legislation/ [https://perma.cc/TR2L-RZ44]; see also An Act to Promote Prescription 
Drug Price Transparency and Cost Control, NASHP, https://nashp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Transparency-Model-Legislation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/272J-FQF3] (last visited July 31, 2018).  
74. About Us, GHJP, https://law.yale.edu/ghjp [https://perma.cc/N8H9-
DDK4] (last visited July 31, 2018) (describing GHJP as “a program hosted jointly by 
Yale Law School (YLS) and Yale School of Public Health (YSPH) that tackles 
contemporary problems at the interface of global health, human rights, and social 
justice”). 
75. About, NPA, http://npalliance.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/77E6-YFY3]
(last visited July 31, 2018) (describing NPA as “a non-partisan, non-profit 
organization” that “creates research and education programs that promote health 
and foster active engagement of physicians with their communities to achieve high 
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Connecticut,76 joined in the transparency effort with a white paper 
entitled “Curbing Unfair Drug Prices: A Primer for States,” which 
provides various strategies for state legislatures to “rein in 
prescription drug prices.”77 Two of these strategies are for states to 
“pass laws that address unfair launch prices and price increases” and 
“pass legislation that mandates public release of as much 
information as possible about drug prices and development, 
manufacturing, and marketing costs on a drug-by-drug basis.”78  
Many of these advocacy groups appear to be centered on the 
same reasoning—“[o]perating with transparency sends a message 
that there’s nothing to hide.”79 Several of these entities also argue 
that a lack of transparency ultimately permits market participants 
such as pharmacy benefit managers (“PBMs”) to engage in 
anticompetitve behavior,80 such as kickbacks from drug 
manufacturers in exchange for exclusivity arrangements (that 
allegedly keep less expensive drugs off the market), as well as 
securing preferential rebates that are not passed on to patients.81  
quality, affordable health care for all”). 
76. About Us, UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE FOUND. OF CONN., 
http://www.universalhealthct.org/en/aboutus [https://perma.cc/4KAL-SZX9] 
(last visited July 31, 2018) (describing the foundation as “a 501(c)(3) research, 
development and education organization dedicated to assuring that the health care 
needs of all Connecticut residents are met”).  
77. New GHJP Report Examines Curbing Unfair Drug Prices, YALE L. SCH. (Aug. 8,
2017), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/new-ghjp-report-examines-curbing-
unfair-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/V3S4-389U]. 
78. Berman et al., supra note 55, at 13–14.
79. Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Iowa Senator, Grassley Works to Have Drug
Company Payments Disclosed (Oct. 23, 2009), https://www.grassley.sen 
ate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-works-have-drug-company-payments-disclosed 
[https://perma.cc/Q4DX-UVTT]. Senator Grassley (R-Iowa) is one of the chief 
proponents of pharmaceutical transparency and disclosure. See, e.g., Press Release, 
Chuck Grassley, Iowa Senator, Grassley Works for Disclosure of Drug Company 
Payments to Medical Groups (Dec. 8, 2009), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/ 
news/news-releases/grassley-works-disclosure-drug-company-payments-medical-gro 
ups [https://perma.cc/PWV6-MRZH]. 
80. Troy Parks, Drug Pricing Need Transparency, Physicians Say, AMA WIRE (Jan.
26, 2017), https://wire.ama-assn.org/ama-news/drug-pricing-needs-transparency-
physicians-say [https://perma.cc/5RM8-NCKX]; see also What is a PBM?, PBM 
WATCH, http://www.pbmwatch.com/ [https://perma.cc/XDU5-4DET] (last visited 
July 31, 2018) (providing background information about PBMs). 
81. See MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE, supra note 43, at 61; Hearing on Section
408(b)(2) Regulation: PBM Compensation and Fee Disclosure, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 
(2014) (citing testimony of David A. Balto), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/ 
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Some researchers, however, challenge the notion that 
transparency is an effective remedy. They contend that the premise 
that disclosure curbs so-called “bad behavior” is based more on the 
public’s negative perception of pharmaceutical companies and 
concerns over the mounting costs of healthcare, than on empirical 
research demonstrating the ability of money to change individual 
behavior.82 Other researchers contend that disclosure alone is not 
the answer, suggesting that “disclosure is a sham; a way of deluding 
ourselves that we have cleansed the problem of conflict of interest 
and bias.”83  
Many policymakers are also opposed to a transparency remedy. 
For example, the Federal Trade Commission has consistently 
expressed concern that pushing for disclosure might have the 
opposite effect and drive pharmaceutical prices higher.84 
files/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/ACBalto061914.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/AC4V-MXU8]. 
82. Adam Licurse et al., The Impact of Disclosing Financial Ties in Research and
Clinical Care: A Systematic Review, 170 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 675 (2010) 
(discussing the lack of data connecting “financial ties” and professional behaviors); 
see also Kathleen Boozang et al., The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Financial 
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research, SSRN 11 (Dec. 5, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1720564 [https://perma.cc/77EE-ZSP4]. 
83. See PETER SNYDER ET AL., SCIENCE AND THE MEDIA: DELGADO’S BRAVE BULLS
AND THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC DISCLOSURE 79, 87 (1st ed. 2009); Paula Dalley, The Use 
and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2007) 
(“Disclosure is a ‘soft’ form of intervention that does not directly mandate change 
in the underlying behavior.”). 
84. Brief for Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Celgene Corp., Civil Action No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D. 
N.J. May 20, 2014), 2014 WL 2968348. 
AB 1960’s mandated disclosure of information may increase the cost of 
pharmaceuticals and health insurance premiums by attenuating 
competition between pharmaceutical companies and by raising the cost 
of generic substitution and clinical interchange. Any such cost increases 
are likely to undermine the ability of some consumers to obtain the 
pharmaceuticals and health insurance they need at a price they can 
afford. 
Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n to Assembly Member Greg Aghazarian, 
(Sept. 7, 2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_ 
documents/ftc-comment-hon.greg-aghazarian-concerning-ca.b.1960-requiring-ph 
armacy-benefit-managers-make-disclosures-purchasers-and-prospective-purchasers 
/v04 0027.pdf [https://perma.cc/G52F-88V5]. 
Additional disclosure and contract responsibilities, including the 
imposition of a fiduciary duty on a PBM in certain of its dealings with 
pharmacies, are likely to increase administrative costs and legal liability 
16
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Furthermore, while transparency is the most common remedy, the 
states, local governments, and local watchdog groups are adopting a 
mixed approach—combining disclosure, enforcement, and 
oversight (e.g., task forces)—in an effort to achieve the desired end 
goal of rational drug pricing.85  
B. Explosive Growth of State and Local Legislative Initiatives
The elevation of Donald Trump to the White House, and the 
resulting gridlock in Washington, has made it increasingly unlikely 
that the federal government will take definitive action to address 
escalating drug prices in the near future.86 Given the lack of action 
by the federal government, states and other local governments are 
promulgating their own rules and regulations.87 These efforts by the 
for performing the PBM’s core functions. All of these legislative 
requirements are likely to cause the prices that PBMs charge for their 
services—and concomitantly, the price of pharmaceutical coverage—to 
rise. 




060018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TAE-X2SC]; see, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade 
Comm’n to the Honorable Mark Formby (Mar. 22, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-letter-honorable-mar 
k-formby-mississippi-house-representatives-concerning-mississippi/110322mississip 
pipbm.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MLN-QNY9]; Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n to 
Senator James L. Seward (Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-honorable 
-james-l.seward-concerning-new-york-senate-bill-58-pharmacy-benefit-managers-pb 
ms/v090006newyorkpbm.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUS2-3HPZ].  
85. Berman et al., supra note 55, 6–8 (discussing current legislative approaches
for controlling drug prices). 
86. See Jonathan D. Rockoff & Thomas M. Burton, Congressional Democrats Object
to White House’s Drug-Cost Plans, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2017, 6:54 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/congressional-democrats-object-to-white-houses-dru 
g-cost-plans-1498085664?mg=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/E6JG-986A]; 
Jonathan D. Rockoff, Trump Administration Makes Drug and Medical-Device Companies 
Nervous, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2017, 3:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-
administration-makes-drug-and-medical-device-makers-nervous-1485288454 [http 
s://perma.cc/TH2Y-DE3M]. 
87. See Lydia Ramsey, “More is Possible”: A Bunch of States are Taking on High Drug
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states and other municipalities are not new, however, as there was 
substantive legislative activity on the topic of drug pricing dating 
back to 2015.88 Nevertheless, both the sheer volume of legislative 
proposals and the increasing likelihood of passage in 2018 are new.89 
In December 2017, NASHP noted that some of the 
recommendations made by the National Academies were “already 
getting trial runs in states.”90 Vermont, in 2016, became the first state 
in the nation to require price transparency reporting, while, in 2017, 
California, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, and Nevada signed into 
law their versions of pricing legislation.91 Since 2015, the number of 
states putting forth cost transparency legislation targeting 
prescription drug costs has increased over 200%.92 At the same time, 
the number of transparency bills introduced in those states 
exploring pricing transparency increased over 475%.93 However, it 
4LNM] (detailing the state laws addressing drug prices). 
88. See generally RICHARD CAUCHI, 2015–2016 LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG COST AND PRICE TRANSPARENCY (Nat’l Conference State 
Legislatures ed., 2016) (discussing state drug price transparency legislation from 
2015–2016). 
89. See Jill Wechsler, Drug Pricing and Quality are Top Issues for 2018, 42
PHARMACY TECH. 20, 20 (2018) (explaining upcoming medical legislation and its 
effect on the medical industry). 
90. Jennifer Reck & Trish Riley, Academy of Sciences Recommends Federal Strategies
to Lower Rx Prices, But Some States Are Already Taking Action, NASHP (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://nashp.org/academy-of-sciences-recommends-federal-strategies-to-lower-rx-
prices-but-some-states-are-already-taking-action/ [https://perma.cc/4WA2-J664].  
91. Id.; see also Alan M. Kirschenbaum & David C. Gibbons, 2017: A Banner Year
for State Laws on Drug Pricing, Price Reporting, and Discounting, FDA LAW BLOG (Nov. 
2, 2017), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2017/11/2017-a-banner-year-for-state-laws-
on-drug-pricing-price-reporting-and-discounting/ [https://perma.cc/8ZKQ-DF 
6E] (providing summaries of California’s S.B. 17, Nevada’s S.B. 539, and Vermont’s 
S.B. 216). 
92. See Fiorentino, supra note 58, at 2. There were two additional states that
introduced cost transparency bills and five additional cost transparency bills in 2017 
that were released after publication.  
93. The legislation discussed below accounts for legislation targeting
pharmaceutical manufacturers only. Id. Thus, legislation that would require 
pharmacy benefits managers to disclose rebates and similar type of legislation is 
excluded. Id. 
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is not just the volume of bills that is important, but the requirements 
they seek to impose on the industry. 
C. The Categories of Pricing Legislation
In the last two years, the states’ bills generally can be broken 
down into two main categories. The first is pricing transparency and 
the second, broadly speaking, is fair pricing (e.g., cost 
justification).94 Within each of these two main categories there are 





Chart 1 - Number of States Cost 





Chart 2 - Number of 
Congressional Cost Transparency 
Bills Introduced
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several unique state variants.95 However, all the individual state 
proposals seem to start with a transparency component.96  
To get even more granular, within the pure transparency 
legislation camp, there are three main subgroups. The first 
subgroup, the Cost Reporting Bills, would require “manufacturers to 
file annual reports on the cost of the drugs.”97 “Costs” would include 
“research and development costs, costs of clinical trials and other 
regulatory costs, total costs for materials, manufacturing and 
administration of the drug, [and] costs associated with the drug’s 
acquisition.”98 Manufacturers would also have to submit information 
on the “total marketing and advertising costs for the promotion of 
the drug directly to potential prescribers and consumers.”99 The 
second subgroup of bills, the Price Disclosure Via Advertising Bills, 
“would require all manufacturers to disclose the wholesale price of 
their drugs in any advertisement occurring within the state.”100 The 
third subgroup, “the Fine Print Cost Disclosure Bills, would require 
some type of disclosure, such as costly new drug notification . . . but 
also tack on additional requirements.”101 For example, the 
manufacturer might be responsible “for hiring independent 
auditors to verify the information in the report,” or additional 
requirements “unrelated to price, such as pharmaceutical 
representative licensure.”102 
In the fair pricing legislation camp, there are also three main 
subcategories of legislative initiatives. The first subcategory, the Cost 
Increase Notification & Reporting Bills, would require manufacturers 
planning to increase the costs of prescription drugs above a certain 
threshold to notify the state and payors (i.e., insurance companies) 
of a planned increase.103 In addition, manufacturers would also need 
to provide “a justification report to the state and/or payors that 
95. See infra Sections III.D–III.E.
96. See id.
97. Fiorentino, supra note 58, at 4.
98. Id.; see, e.g., S.B. 737, 2017 Leg., 2017 Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017) (requiring
every manufacturer of a prescription drug made available in the state to file a report 
regarding each such drug that contains the total cost to produce the drug). 
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includes other information relating to spend[ing] for the particular 
drugs.”104  
The second subcategory, the WAC/AWP Reporting Bills, “would 
require manufacturers with a certain increase in the drug’s [Whole 
Sale Acquisition Cost (“WAC”)] or [Average Wholesale Price 
(“AWP”)] to justify the increase and provide a cost report that 
includes other information relating to spending for the drug.”105  
The third fair pricing subcategory, the Costly New Drug 
Notification & Justification Reporting Bills, is “composed of bills that 
would require a manufacturer which is set to receive U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration approval of a drug, that will be costly, to notify 
the state and/or payors . . . as well as provide a justification report 
to[them].”106  
D. Vermont Leads the Way
Vermont has a strong activist-history when it comes to targeting 
the pharmaceutical industry with laws, ranging from its unique gift 
ban to its disclosure law on spending with healthcare professionals 
and drug samples.107 Vermont’s pharmaceutical pricing legislation 
combines the elements of transparency with fair pricing and requires 
a state commission.108 Under the Vermont variant, “a state entity or 
a commission would be responsible for creating a public list of 
prescription drugs, [and] require the manufacturer to report” to a 
state regulatory agency or commission.109 The state agency or 
commission would also be responsible for submitting a public report 
to the legislature.110 In addition to a price-marketing disclosure 
law,111 Vermont now requires cost transparency for certain 
“high-cost” prescription drugs.112 Vermont’s Attorney General’s 
Office (AGO) identified manufacturers who are required to justify 
the cost of certain prescription drugs, which the AGO will report to 




107. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631a (2016). 
108. See Fiorentino, supra note 58, at 4–5. 
109. Id. at 5. 
110. Id. 
111. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4633 (2016). 
112. Id. § 4635. 
113. Id. §§ 4635(c)(1), 4635(d). 
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E. California, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, and Nevada Follow Suit
California’s Governor approved Senate Bill 17 in October 
2017.114 The law requires manufacturers of a prescription drug with 
a WAC of $40 or more for a thirty-day supply to provide written 
notification at least sixty days prior to any price increase to state 
purchasers, health plans or insurers, and PBMs, if the WAC’s 
increase is at least 16%.115 Manufacturers providing WAC increase 
notifications will also be required to report additional information 
quarterly, such as a description of the financial and nonfinancial 
factors that contributed to the increase, to the Office of Statewide 
Health Planning and Development (OSHPD).116 Further, all 
manufacturers must notify OSHPD in writing before introducing a 
new prescription drug into the commercial market if the WAC 
exceeds a specified threshold.117 In November 2017, OSHPD 
published its implementation plan.118 Although the reporting 
requirements do not go into effect until 2019,119 PhRMA has already 
challenged the law for constitutional violations.120 
In Louisiana, two laws were enacted during the 2017 Regular 
Session of the Louisiana Legislature addressing prescription drug 
price transparency: Act 220 and Act 236. Act 220 added a law 
requiring prescription drug manufacturers who engage in 
“prescription drug marketing” to disclose to the Louisiana Board of 
Pharmacy (BOP) the WAC for the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) approved drugs marketed in the state.121 While quarterly 
114. S. 17, 2017. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
115. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 127677(a)–(b) (West 2018). 
116. Id. § 127679. 
117. See id. § 127681 (requiring reporting if the WAC “exceeds the threshold set 
for a specialty drug under the Medicare Part D program (Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-173))”). 
 118. Cost Transparency Rx Implementation Plan, OSHPD (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.oshpd.ca.gov/documents/LawsRegs/SB-17-Implementation-Plan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7LR9-TRQS].  
119. See id. 
 120. Greg Langlois, Pharma Group Sues to Block California’s New Drug Pricing Law, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.bna.com/pharma-group-sues-
n73014473040/ [https://perma.cc/5YKC-FNEQ].  
121. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2255.11 (2017). The term “prescription drug 
marketing” is broadly defined and “means to provide educational or marketing 
information or materials regarding a prescription drug in any form including but 
not limited to all of the following: (a) Face-to-face meetings[;] (b) Physical 
mailings[;] (c) Telephone conversations[; and] (d) Electronic mail or facsimile” Id. 
22
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss4/2
  
2018] THE WAR ON DRUG PRICING 1187 
reporting is required,122 there are no penalties attached for non-
compliance.123 Act 236 directs the BOP to develop a website that will 
allow prescribers to access prescription drug pricing information.124 
Act 236 also specifies, among other provisions, information the BOP 
will collect from manufacturers and how marketers may provide the 
required information.125  
Maryland was successful in enacting a law prohibiting price 
gouging, which also contained a WAC disclosure component.126 The 
state has focused its efforts on “essential off-patent or generic 
drug[s].”127 These drugs are defined as prescription drugs for which 
all exclusive marketing rights have expired.128 They are available for 
sale in the state and either appear on the World Health 
Organization’s most recent Model List for Medicines129 or have been 
§ 40:2255.1(2) (alterations added). It should be noted that New Mexico has had a
similar price reporting law on the books since 2007. 
A person who manufactures a prescription drug, including a generic 
prescription drug, that is sold in New Mexico shall file with the human 
services department: (1) the average manufacturer price for the drug; 
(2) the price that each wholesaler or pharmacy benefit manager doing 
business in this state pays the manufacturer to purchase the drug; and 
(3) the price paid to the manufacturer by any entity in an arrangement 
or contract that sells or provides prescription drugs in New Mexico 
without the services of a wholesaler. 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2E-1(A) (2016). 
122. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2255.11. 
 123. Compare H.B. 436, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2017) (illustrating that the 
original proposed bill included § 2255.14 “Rulemaking; enforcement”), with LA. 
STAT. ANN. § 40:2255.11 (illustrating the absence of the enforcement clause). 
124. LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1251(A)(1) (2017).  
125. Id. § 37:1251(A)(2)–(3). Section (A)(2) specifies that “[t]he website shall 
include, at a minimum, the following data elements, separated by therapeutic 
category: (a) Name of the product[;] (b) Whether the drug is a brand name or a 
generic[;] (c) Drug strength[;] (d) Per-unit wholesale acquisition cost of the drug[; 
and] (e) Any disclaimers deemed appropriate by the board.” The Louisiana Board 
of Pharmacy has developed a dedicated page on the agency’s website, which 
provides an overview of the laws, the information to be reported, and how 
companies should submit the information. Pharmaceutical Cost Transparency, LA. 
BOARD PHARMACY, http://www.pharmacy.la.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder 
&tmp=hom e&pid=403 [https://perma.cc/5DGP-ENFV] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
126. H.B. 631, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017).  
127. See id. 
128. Id. § 2-801(B)(1)(i). 
129. WHO Model Lists of Essential Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/en/ [https://p 
erma.cc/V23G-FWJQ] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
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designated by Maryland’s Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene 
as an “essential medicine.”130  
Under Maryland’s concept of price gouging, the Maryland 
Medical Assistance Program (MAP) is directed to notify the state 
attorney general of any increase that would result in: 
(1) an increase of 50% or more in the WAC within the previous 
year; or  
(2) an increase of 50% or more in the price paid by MAP in the 
previous year; and  
(3) either a thirty-day supply, full course of treatment, or the 
only available quantity that does not correspond to a thirty-
day supply of an essential off-patent or generic drug would 
cost more than $80.131  
Following a request from the Maryland Attorney General, 
manufacturers of these drugs would be required to submit a report 
within forty-five days of the request containing information such as 
the cost of production and reasons for the price increase.132 
Additionally, the attorney general was granted the authority to 
require the manufacturer to reimburse consumers, including a 
third-party payor, any money it acquired as a result of a price 
increase violation.133 In June 2017, the Association for Accessible 
Medicines (AAM)134 filed suit against the state of Maryland claiming 
that HB 631 violates the United States Constitution (the Commerce 
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment), seeking both a temporary 
restraining order and permanent injunction prohibiting the 
implementation or enforcement of HB 631.135 But by April 2018, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held the law “violate[d] 
130. H.B. 631, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 2-801(B)(1)(ii) (Md. 2017). 
131. Id. §§ 2-803(A)(1)(i)–(2)(ii). 
132. Id. §2-803(B).  
133. Id. § 2-803(D)(3). 
134. AAM was formerly known as the Generic Pharmaceutical Association. 
135. Compl. ¶ 8, Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, No. 1:17-cv-1860, 2017 WL 
4347818 (D. Md. July 6, 2017); see also The Dormant Commerce Clause: What Impact Does 
It Have on the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Costs?, NASHP (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://nashp.org/the-dormant-commerce-clause-what-impact-does-it-have-on-the-
regulation-of-pharmaceutical-costs/ [https://perma.cc/BV68-F7MW] (providing 
multiple dormant clause resources, such as insights and analysis, a blog, and  an 
“easy-to-understand table featuring Dormant Commerce Clause’s ‘Dos and 
Don’ts’”). 
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the dormant commerce clause because it directly regulates the price 
of transactions that occur outside Maryland.”136   
New York’s transparency law, on the other hand, comes with a 
twist.137 In the New York variant, the legislature established a 
Medicaid drug cap to address drug expenditures.138 To address costs, 
the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health 
(Commissioner) is responsible for setting a year-to-year Medicaid 
drug expenditure growth target.139 Quarterly, the Department of 
Health and Division of the Budget must assess “the projected total 
amount to be expended in the year on a cash basis by the Medicaid 
program for each drug, and the projected annual amount of state 
funds Medicaid drug expenditures on a cash basis for all drugs” and 
submit a report to the Drug Utilization Review (“DUR”) Board that 
provides, among other information, projected Medicaid drug 
expenditures.140 In the event the expenditures from the previous 
 136. Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, No. 17-2166, 2018 WL 1770978, at *1 
(4th Cir. Apr. 13, 2018). Not willing to concede defeat, Maryland Attorney General 
Brian E. Frosh has asked the full Fourth Circuit to rehear the case en banc. Ovetta 
Wiggins, Frosh Asks a Federal Appeals Court to Rehear Case on Md. Drug Price-Gouging 




 137. A. 2939, 2017 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); S. 2007B, 2017 Leg. Gen. 
Assemb. (N.Y. 2017); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 280 (McKinney 2017). 
 138. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 280(1) (finding that “[s]ince two thousand 
eleven, the state has taken significant steps to contain costs in the Medicaid program 
by imposing a statutory limit on annual growth. Drug expenditures, 
however, continually outpace other cost components causing significant pressure 
on the state, providers, and patient access operating under the Medicaid global 
cap”).  
 139. See id. § 280(2). The year-to-year growth targets for 2017 through 2019 are 
as follows: 
(a) for state fiscal year 2017–2018, be limited to the ten-year rolling 
average of the medical component of the consumer price index plus five 
percent and minus a pharmacy savings target of $55 million;  
(b) for state fiscal year 2018–2019, be limited to the ten-year rolling 
average of the medical component of the consumer price index plus 
four percent and minus a pharmacy savings target of $85 million; and 
(c) for state fiscal year 2019–2020, be limited to the ten-year rolling 
average of the medical component of the consumer price index plus 
four percent and minus a pharmacy savings target of $85 million. 
Id. 
 140. See id. § 280(3) (providing that the other information “includ[es] the 
amounts, in aggregate thereof, attributable to the net cost of: changes in the 
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quarter indicate that the annual growth limit will be exceeded, the 
Commissioner can recommend that the drug(s) be referred to the 
DUR Board.141 In turn the DUR Board will determine “whether a 
target supplemental Medicaid rebate should be paid by the 
manufacturer of the drug to the department and the target amount 
of the rebate.”142 If the DUR Board recommends a target rebate, 
the Commissioner will require the manufacturer to pay the 
supplemental rebate.143 However, price reporting is triggered only if 
the manufacturer refuses to provide supplemental Medicaid rebates 
to the New York Department of Health.144 In April 2018, Vertex 
utilization of drugs by Medicaid recipients; changes in the number of Medicaid 
recipients; changes to the cost of brand name drugs and changes to the cost of 
generic drugs”). 
141. Id. § 280(3)(a). 
 142. Id. It should be noted that under Section 3(b), prior to the DUR Board is 
notified, “the [Department of Health] shall notify the manufacturer of such drug 
and shall attempt to reach agreement with the manufacturer on a rebate for the 
drug.” Id. § 280(3)(b). If a rebate is agreed upon, then the drug will not be referred 
to the DUR Board. Id. § 280(3)(c); see also id. § 280(4), (5)(e) (providing how the 
DUR Board should determine whether to recommend a target supplemental rebate 
for a drug and how the DUR Board should formulate a recommendation 
concerning a target rebate). 
143. See id. § 280(5)(a). 
144. See id. § 280(6)(a). Reporting would include the following: 
i) the actual cost of developing, manufacturing, producing (including
the cost per dose of production), and distributing the drug;
ii) research and development costs of the drug, including payments to
predecessor entities conducting research and development, such as
biotechnology companies, universities and medical schools, and
private research institutions;
iii) administrative, marketing, and advertising costs for the drug,
apportioned by marketing activities that are directed to consumers,
marketing activities that are directed to prescribers, and the total
cost of all marketing and advertising that is directed primarily to
consumers and prescribers in New York, including but not limited to
prescriber detailing, copayment discount programs, and direct-to-
consumer marketing;
iv) the extent of utilization of the drug;
v) prices for the drug that are charged to purchasers outside the United
States;
vi) prices charged to typical purchasers in the state, including but not
limited to pharmacies, pharmacy chains, pharmacy wholesalers, or
other direct purchasers;
vii) the average rebates and discounts provided per payer type in the
State; and
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Pharmaceuticals’ costly cystic fibrosis drug, Orkambi, became the 
test case of the state’s new law as the Department of Health 
unanimously voted to negotiate a rebate; the outcome remains to be 
seen and the company “plans to take a hard line”.145 
The passage of Nevada’s pricing transparency law, Senate Bill 
539, is perhaps the best illustration of why the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers will ultimately lose this war.146 In Nevada’s case, a 
major union became a powerful force against the pharmaceutical 
industry. Nevada’s Culinary Health Fund is a labor management 
trust fund that provides health benefits to approximately 55,000 
workers and their 70,000 dependents in the Las Vegas area.147 In an 
effort to contain rising health care costs for its members, the 
Culinary Health Fund contributed greatly to legislators advocating 
for the successful passage of SB 539.148 
While SB 539 contains numerous provisions targeting the 
pharmaceutical industry, the primary focus of the bill concerns 
pricing transparency of diabetes medication.149 By February 1, 2018, 
the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services (NDHHS) 
must create a master list of all insulins and biguanides, and their 
viii) the average profit margin of each drug over the prior five-year period
and the projected profit margin anticipated for such drug.
Id. § 280(6)(a)(i)-(viii). 
 145. See Ed Silverman, New York Panel Votes to Lower the Cost of a Pricey Vertex Drug 
for Cystic Fibrosis, STAT (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/ 
2018/04/26/new-york-vertex-cystic-fibrosis-price/ [https://perma.cc/8TA9-S7 
G9]. 
 146. See Megan Messerly, Labor Health Fund Says Attorney General's Office, 
Legislature Could 'Potentially Eviscerate' Insulin Transparency Law, NEV. INDEP. (Oct. 15, 
2017, 2:05 AM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/labor-health-fund-
says-attorney-generals-office-legislature-could-potentially-eviscerate-insulin-transpar 
ency-law [https://perma.cc/5YAV-2MN3] (according to an official from the Nevada 
Department of Health and Human Services, the local Nevada Culinary Union was 
able to best the industry’s lobbyists).  
 147. About Us, CULINARY HEALTH FUND, https://www.culinaryhealthfund.org/ 
about-us/ [https://perma.cc/WAZ5-4LDY] (last visited July 31, 2018).  
 148. See Culinary Union, Culinary Union Thanks Governor Brian Sandoval for 
Signing Historic Pharmaceutical Transparency Bill into Law and Senator Yvanna Cancela 




perma.cc/ZW4P-33VQ]; Messerly, supra note 146. 
 149. See S.B. 539 § 28(3), 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017) (setting the effective 
date for §§ 1 to 6.5 to be Oct. 1, 2017).  
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corresponding WAC.150 Using the list, NDHHS will then create a 
secondary list of those drugs with an increase in the WAC equal to 
or greater than the percentage increase in the Consumer Price 
Index, Medical Care Component (CPI-M) from the previous year, or 
twice the CPI-M in the preceding two years.151  
Manufacturers named on the secondary list must file a report 
that contains information, such as drug production costs, 
manufacturer profit, and costs associated with coupons.152 They also 
must state a rationale justifying the WAC increase.153 Also, unlike the 
Vermont pricing legislation, any information that a manufacturer 
reports to the state is not considered a trade secret and can be 
disclosed to the public.154 
Currently, the pricing transparency provisions are the subject of 
a lawsuit filed by PhRMA and the Biotechnology Innovation 
Organization (“BIO”).155 PhRMA and BIO contend that, among 
other things, SB 539 “interferes with the federal patent and 
trade-secret laws, deprives manufacturers of their property interest 
in their trade secrets, and improperly overrides the regulatory 
choices of every other state.”156 While it is unclear whether PhRMA 
and BIO will prevail, initial indications do not look promising. For 
example, the industry representatives failed to meet the burden for 
granting a temporary restraining order (TRO).157 This is another 
clear indication that drug pricing transparency and fairness are 
topics that are not going away. 
Additionally, states have begun to seek legal action to control 
drug costs. The Connecticut Attorney General’s office launched an 
150. Id. § 3.6(1). 
151. Id. § 3.6(2). 
152. Id. § 3.8. 
153. Id. § 4. 
154. See id. § 9 (revising the definition of “trade secret” to exclude information 
manufacturers report under §§ 3.8 and 4 of SB 539). 
 155. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315-JCM 
(CWH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149468 (D. Nev. Sept. 14, 2017); see also David C. 
Gibbons & Alan M. Kirschenbaum, PhRMA and BIO Team Up Again to Challenge a 
State Drug Pricing Law, FDA LAW BLOG (Sept. 7, 2017, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/2017/09/phrma-and-bio-team-up-again-to-challenge-
a-state-drug-pricing-law/ [https://perma.cc/Q6KN-SL38] (providing a summary of 
the complaint). 
 156. Compl. at 2, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Sandoval, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 149468 (D. Nev. Sept. 1, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-02315 JCM (CWH)). 
 157. Order at 1, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Sandoval, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 149468 (D. Nev. Oct. 17, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-02315 JCM (CWH).  
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investigation, culminating in a coalition of forty-five states who 
brought suit, alleging that generic pharmaceutical companies 
engaged in price-fixing.158 The multi-district litigation claims that 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers provided incentives to large 
purchasers like McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health Inc., and 
AmerisourceBergen Corp., to keep prices artificially high.159 To 
support the contention of price-fixing, the coalition cites the 
companies’ 10-k and other regulatory filings required by the SEC, 
some of which contain troubling statements about the relationships 
between generic manufacturers and purchasers.160  
IV. LEVERAGING COMPLIANCE
There are no easy answers to the dilemmas and trade-offs posed 
by the current need to curb rising healthcare costs, while continuing 
to find and produce new medicinal treatments. Ultimately, it will 
involve complex ethical decisions, pitting the value of life against the 
costs to achieve it. However, these issues are outside the scope of this 
article. 
In the short term, for the pharmaceutical manufacturers facing 
an onslaught of pricing legislation, it comes down to trust, which is 
something that compliance professionals know a great deal about.161 
 158. See Press Release, Conn. Attorney General’s Office, AG Jepsen Leads 
Coalition in New, Expanded Complaint in Federal Generic Drug Antitrust Lawsuit 
(Oct. 31, 2017), http://portal.ct.gov/AG/Press-Releases/2017-Press-Releases/AG-
Jepsen-Leads-Coalition-in-New-Expanded-Complaint-in-Federal-Generic-Drug-Anti 
trust-Lawsuit [https://perma.cc/9XMH-3N4B ]; Nathan Vardi, States Focus on 




159. See Vardi, supra note 158. 
 160. Id. For example, McKesson stated its deals “include an inflation-based 
compensation component whereby we benefit when the manufacturers increase 
their prices as we sell our existing inventory at the new higher prices,” and, 
according to AmeriSourceBergen, “[i]f the frequency or rate of generic 
pharmaceutical price deflation accelerates, our results of operations could be 
adversely affected.” McKesson Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (May 5, 
2016); AmeriSourceBergen Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Nov. 25, 
2014). 
 161. See Deann M. Baker, Compliance Professionals Trust and Verify—It’s What We 
Do, HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE ASS’N (Jan. 2016), https://www.hcca-
info.org/Resources/View/tabid/451/ArticleId/5561/Compliance-Professionals-
Trust-and-Ve rify-Its-what-we-do.aspx [https://perma.cc/S54H-A8YQ]. 
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Compliance professionals also have the tools and processes to help 
companies demonstrate social responsibility and trustworthiness.162 
In other words, they have tools that will allow drug companies to 
demonstrate that they understand the “social contract” of their 
industry.163 Finally, the tools that life science compliance 
professionals wield have been honed and tested successfully over the 
past two decades.164 We believe that several of these tools can be 
effective in this situation as well. 
A. Adopting a Voluntary Pricing Code
At the outset, we proposed that the industry create and adopt a 
voluntary pricing code. Companies have adopted these voluntary 
pricing codes.165 In fact, several states have mandated compliance 
with the Code as a prerequisite for selling pharmaceuticals to their 
citizens.166 Various executives within the industry have begun to call 
 162. See id. (discussing how the compliance professional can use auditing and 
monitoring within their own corporations). 
 163. See Eric Sherbet, The Top Five Business Benefits of Compliance, 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPLIANCE MONITOR (July 14, 2014), http://www.pharma 
compliancemonitor.com/top-five-business-benefits-compliance/7233/ [https:// 
perma.cc/TRF5-HW4G]. See generally Jan C. Heller & Mark E. Meaney, Integrating 
Ethics into a Compliance Program, in THE HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONAL’S 
MANUAL 62,001, ¶ 60,180 (Health Care Compliance Ass’n, 2017) (“A compliance 
professional’s language and style of communication should convey a message of 
trust and support for shared corporate values.”). 
 164. See Joseph E. Murphy & Debbie Troklus, Compliance Officers and 
Infrastructure, in THE HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONAL’S MANUAL, 51,011, 
¶¶ 50,205–40 (Health Care Compliance Ass’n, 2017). 
165. See, e.g., Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals, PHRMA (Feb. 2, 
2017), http://www.phrma.org/codes-and-guidelines/code-on-interactions-with-
health-care-professionals [https://perma.cc/6MMD-3ZVP] (announcing adoption 
of a voluntary code of conduct). 
 166. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111N, § 2 (West 2014) (adopting standard 
marketing code of conduct for all pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturing 
companies that employ a person to sell or market prescription drugs or medical 
devices in the commonwealth); Compliance Packet for Manufacturers and Wholesalers of 
Drugs, Medicines, Chemicals, Devices, or Appliances, NEV. STATE BD. OF PHARMACY (June 
25, 2013), http://bop.nv.gov/uploadedfiles/bopnvgov/content/resources/all/ 
ab_128_compliancepacket.pdf [https://perma.cc/A323-QWP2] (requiring 
wholesalers or manufacturers who employ a person to sell or market a drug or 
medicine must comply with certain model codes of conduct); Erik Snapp & Monika 
Blacha, Mandatory Compliance with “Voluntary” Codes, LAW360 (Oct. 30, 2008), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/74986/mandatory-compliance-with-voluntary-co 
des [https://perma.cc/P6GR-V28B] (stating that although industry codes are often 
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for what amounts to a voluntary pricing code. In September 2016, at 
the height of the Mylan EpiPen controversy, Brent Saunders called 
upon the industry to honor its unwritten social contract with 
patients.167 After condemning “those outliers who have taken 
dramatic price increases—or engaged in what the public thinks of as 
price gouging,” Saunders stated, “we must keep this social contract 
in mind as we make business decisions that ultimately improve 
wellbeing, and as a result, address the hopes others place in us.”168 
To aid his company and other drug makers in making those business 
decisions, Saunders outlined five key activities: 
(1) Pricing products based on the value they create, 
(2) Avoiding price gouging or predatory pricing, 
(3) Limiting price increases as to both frequency 
(once per year) and amount (slightly above the 
annual inflation rate), 
(4) Avoiding major price increases when products 
near patent expiration, and 
(5) Disclosing the impact of price on the company.169 
While not formally presented as such, Saunders’ ideas, nevertheless, 
amount to the tenets of a de facto voluntary code.170  
Recently, John Maraganore, CEO of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, 
pledged, “[w]e will not arbitrarily increase prices beyond the price 
of inflation [because] [w]e think the most difficult practice to 
explain to payors and patients is drug price increases.”171 While two 
described as “voluntary,” they have become mandatory minimum standards of 
conduct in a growing number of states); Joseph H. Zwicker & Dara Z. Kesselheim, 
Stringent Requirements for Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Companies in Massachusetts, 
CHOATE, https://www.acc.com/chapters/ne/upload/Stringent-Requirements-for-
Health-Care-Practitioners-in-Mass.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXX5-TBLG] (last 
visited July 31, 2018) (evaluating impact of strict marketing code of conduct on 
pharmaceutical and medical device companies doing business in Massachusetts). 
 167. Brent Saunders, Our Social Contract with Patients, ALLERGAN: CEO BLOG 
(Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.allergan.com/news/ceo-blog/september-2016/our-
social-contract-with-patients [https://perma.cc/NL6F-U5ZW]. 
168. Id. 
 169. See Seth Whitelaw, Pharma Pricing & One Bold CEO, WHITELAW COMPLIANCE
GROUP (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.whitelawcompliance.com/blog/pharma-
pricing-one-bold-ceo/ [https://perma.cc/3ZQR-RAJ6]. 
170. Id. (calling Saunders’ approach “alien,” but also “achievable and 
necessary”). 
 171. See Matthew Herper, Alnylam Chief Makes Pricing Pledges Before Drug is Even 
Approved, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
matthewherper/2017/11/30/alnylam-chief-makes-pricing-pledges-before-drug-is-
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CEOs do not constitute a trend, there seems to be a glimmer of 
recognition among pharmaceutical CEOs of the need to address 
price increases in a straight forward manner.172  
Creation and adoption of a voluntary code by the drug industry 
would constitute a substantial step towards defusing the current 
acrimonious environment. The National Academies agree that this 
is necessary as “[a]dvocacy for cooperation and collaboration is likely 
to be more productive when making recommendations that will 
require sacrifice across many components of the health care 
sector.”173 It also would be a step towards providing increased 
transparency to the system, which the National Academies consensus 
study supports and recommends.174 
B. Standardizing the Price Setting Process
In addition to the creation and adoption of a voluntary code, we 
believe that another set of compliance tools—needs assessments and 
standard review processes—would help the industry address the 
ongoing perception that price increases are arbitrary. The recent 
examples of aggressive price increases have served to strengthen that 
perception.175 If the industry critics and activists only had a few 
egregious examples to point to, it is unlikely that we would be seeing 
the sustained level of legislative activity at all levels of government. 
However, there is a more robust source that outlines the extent to 
which the pharmaceutical industry’s pricing house is in disarray.176   
The Senate Finance Committee undertook an investigation on 
the pricing of Solvadi and its impact on the United States health care 
even-approved/#4cb7cba26265 [https://perma.cc/6TEJ-VLUN] (discussing 
Alnylam’s pledge to “put patients first”).     
 172. See, e.g., Henry Waxman et al., Getting to the Root of High Prescription 
Drug Prices, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 2017), http://www.commonwealth 
fund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2017/jul/waxman_getting_to_ 
root_high_rx_drug_prices_ib_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KGM-GKH8] (discussing 
high prescription drug prices, concluding, “[d]rug manufacturers should be able 
to clearly articulate and justify their drug pricing decisions in a clear, 
straightforward manner to the public”). 
173. MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE, supra note 43, at 159. 
 174. See id. at 160 (“[T]ransparency likely will reduce bad behavior and abuse in 
the market. Participants in the markets will perform better.”). 
175. See supra discussion Section II.A. 
176. See S. COMM. ON FIN., 114TH CONG., supra note 54 (discussing the various 
factors that affect the pharmaceutical industry’s pricing determinations). 
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system.177 Solvadi is a pill to treat Hepatitis C and is manufactured 
and marketed by Gilead Sciences, Inc. (Gilead).178 Gilead priced 
Solvadi at $1,000 per pill, costing the average patient approximately 
$84,000.179 Critics and physicians alike vilified Gilead for price 
gouging.180 The Committee determined that the pricing decision for 
Solvadi was based on “setting the price such that it would not only 
maximize revenue, but also prepare the market for Harvoni 
[Solvadi’s successor] and its even higher price.”181 Furthermore, the 
Committee concluded that “Gilead’s goal throughout its pricing 
decision process appears to have been to identify the price just below 
the level where payors would place significant restrictions on patient 
access.”182 As a result, the company and its consultants developed 
multiple pricing scenarios to find that optimal level.183 
The elements that were not included in the pricing decision 
were just as important as those elements that were included. Based 
on the Committee’s review: 
Gilead acquired access to its sofosbuvir-based drugs 
through a multi-billion dollar acquisition and spent 
hundreds of millions of dollars more completing clinical 
trials and FDA approvals. While there were extensive 
177. See id. at 114–20. 
 178. See Melanie Haiken, FDA Approves Breakthrough New Drug for Hepatitis 
C—2nd in Two Weeks, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2013, 3:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/melaniehaiken/2013/12/10/fda-approves-breakthrough-new-drug-for-hepat 
itis-c-2nd-in-two-weeks/#7e2557aa2b2d [https://perma.cc/UVT7-GDPJ] (stating 
how John Ward, CDC director of the Division of Viral Hepatitis, called Sovaldi “a 
landmark advance in the treatment of Hepatitis C”). 
179. See Margot Sanger-Katz, $1,000 Hepatitis Pill Shows Why Fixing Health Costs is 
so Hard, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 08/ 
03/upshot/is-a-1000-pill-really-too-much.html?mtrref=www.google.com [https:// 
perm a.cc/3WAS-C6ST]. 
 180. See John LaMattina, Gilead’s CEO Admits to ‘Failures’ in Setting Price of $1,000-
A-Pill Breakthrough, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
johnlamattina/2016/12/08/gileads-ceo-apologetic-about-sovaldis-1000-per-pill-pri 
ce-tag/#541ea2f61a97 [https://perma.cc/8PQX-WUYM]; Brendan Pierson, Gilead 
Sued Over ‘Exorbitant’ Hepatitis C Drug Prices, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2014, 2:55 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/health-sovaldi/gilead-sued-over-exorbitant-hepa 
titis-c-drug-prices-idUSL1N0TU27W20141210 [https://perma.cc/R4YT-M74E]; 
Lisa Schencker, Antitrust Suit Accuses Sovaldi Maker Gilead of Price-Gouging, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/ article/ 
20141210/NEWS/312109945 [https://perma.cc/EUU7-JXEQ]. 
181. Id. at 117. 
182. Id. 
183. See id. 
33
Whitelaw et al.: Drug Pricing—The Next Compliance Waterloo
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
  
1198 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:4 
discussions regarding return on those investments while 
Gilead was considering the acquisition of Pharmasset, 
there is scant evidence that return on these investments 
played a significant role in determining the pricing of these 
drugs. Similarly, the cost of manufacturing Sovaldi, which 
was nominal, played no part in establishing the price. In an 
interview, Gilead executive Jim Meyers, who played a lead 
part in making the pricing recommendation did not know 
the cost of manufacturing the drug.184 
Therefore, it appears that traditional pricing rationales often 
touted by the pharmaceutical industry, such as recouping R&D and 
manufacturing costs while making a reasonable profit, were not at 
work in this situation.185 While Solvadi is only one case study, it 
outlines perhaps the most significant challenge for the 
pharmaceutical industry when it comes to price—there is no 
standard price setting process.186 This is where compliance can help. 
Less than ten years ago, the industry faced a similar situation in 
setting compensation for healthcare professionals, institutions, and 
organizations. While everyone got paid, most drug companies did 
not know what was paid each year by the type of service.187 That 
changed with the government’s increased anti-kickback 
enforcement efforts and the Physician’s Payment Sunshine Act 
(Sunshine Act) that was part of the Affordable Care Act.188 What 
emerged was a scripted process that began with a needs assessment 
and concluded with a cross-functional review session.189 
184. Id. 
 185. See, e.g., Ads: Let’s Talk About Cost, http://www.phrma.org/media/ads-let-s-
talk-about-cost [https://perma.cc/PG9E-LRWV] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
186. See Jessica Wapner, How Prescription Drugs Get Their Prices, Explained, 
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/prescription-
drug-pricing-569444 [https://perma.cc/HY63-YTGA] (stating that there is no 
formula to set prescription drug prices). 
 187. See generally Elizabeth Richardson, The Physician Payments Sunshine Act: New 
Regulations Require Medical Product Manufacturers to Publicly Report Payments Made to 
Physicians and Teaching Hospitals, HEALTH AFF. 1, 1–2 (2014) (discussing how many 
physicians somehow received compensation from pharmaceutical companies). 
188. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 
§ 6002, 124 Stat. 119, 689 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h (2010))
(amending Part A of title XI of the Social Security Act by adding section 1128G). 
 189. See generally Ilyssa Levins, Seeing the Sunshine in the Sunshine Act, 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPLIANCE MONITOR (June 27, 2014), http://www.pharma 
compliancemonitor.com/seeing-sunshine-sunshine-act/7146/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2A8U-VZUJ]; Katherine Norris, The Future’s So . . . Corporate Integrity Agreements Then 
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While the needs assessment document varies by company, “the 
important questions of ‘why,’ ‘what,’ and ‘how’ [are] a critical part 
of the needs assessment process in determining whether the 
proposed services fulfill a legitimate business need.”190 Although 
these needs assessments were originally developed in context of 
engaging the services of healthcare providers, we believe that using 
the needs assessment tools and techniques will work well for pricing 
decisions. 
Using a needs assessment tool imposes rigor and enforces 
discipline. For the needs assessment to be adequate, all the necessary 
supporting information must be assembled and analyzed.191 
Moreover, a needs assessment process requires a disciplined 
approach that transcends the creation of the final, finished 
document. Therefore, if a needs assessment was integrated as part of 
the pricing determination process, companies would have basic 
information, such as R&D and manufacturing costs, and could avoid 
embarrassing “Jim Meyers” type situations or worse.192 The same 
holds true for the cross-functional review session. Multidisciplinary 
team reviews are commonplace within pharmaceutical companies.193 
Consequently, the concept and operations of multi-disciplinary 
review teams are well-settled constructs. 
In the case of a pricing review team, pharmaceutical companies 
will face the difficulty of determining team membership. Product 
pricing, as distinguished from the discipline of government pricing, 
and Now, 2.2 Life Sci. Compliance Update 12 (2016). 
 190. See Tynan Olechny & Christina Hummel, Feeling Needy—The Why, What and 
How of Needs Assessments, 3.1 LIFE SCI. COMPLIANCE UPDATE 2 (2017) (discussing what 
constitutes an effective-needs assessment). See generally Michelle Cooper & Margaret 
Hambleton, Risk Assessment Basics for Compliance Officers, in THE HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONAL’S MANUAL, 41,001, ¶ 40,100 (Health Care Compliance 
Ass’n 2017) (discussing risk assessment and mitigation strategies). 




 192. See S. COMM. ON FIN., 114TH CONG., supra note 54. Meyers was Gilead’s Vice 
President of North American Commercial Operations in 2015 and should have 
known how much it cost to produce Solvardi. See id.  
 193. See Denise Myshko, Cross-Functional Teams: Models of Success, PHARMAVOICE
(Sept. 2006), http://www.pharmavoice.com/article/2006-09-cross-functional-
teams/ [https://perma.cc/4NU7-7UVX] (“[T]he most effective organizations 
structure themselves using multidisciplinary teams.”). 
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is spread over many areas in most organizations.194 However, most 
organizations will likely involve their compliance, legal, and finance 
officers. Beyond this core, including additional disciplines is a matter 
of organizational design and culture. 
C. Managing Disclosure
Based on our review of the legislative landscape, mandatory 
pricing disclosure will continue to expand beyond the handful of 
states and local jurisdictions that presently require it. Also, absent an 
intensive and successful lobbying effort at the congressional level, 
preemptive relief—if there is any potential for it—is a long way off. 
Therefore, drug companies will face a myriad of price disclosure 
frameworks, at least in the near future. It is naïve to believe 
compliance can guide these various legislative regimens toward a 
meaningful disclosure frame. Rather, managing the overall 
disclosure process to minimize the impact on the company is a more 
realistic role for compliance. Once more, compliance officers have 
a great deal of experience with this.195 
Despite the existence of the federal Sunshine Act, there is no 
single, harmonized payment disclosure framework. While individual 
states cannot require separate disclosure of the same federal 
information, they are free to pursue and require the disclosure of 
additional information.196 Therefore, states such as California, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Vermont, maintain their own 
separate disclosure schemes.197 Pharmaceutical compliance officers 
 194. See Wendy Goldstein, Insight: Life Science Compliance Considerations for 2016, 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPLIANCE MONITOR (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.pharma 
compliancemonitor.com/insight-life-sciences-compliance-considerations-for-2016/ 
10376 [https://perma.cc/5MCV-G7EY] (“The time is ripe to ensure that all 
processes and systems are current (including training on such processes and 
systems) to maintain compliance with applicable U.S. and foreign pricing laws and 
marketing laws relevant to communicating prices and value propositions.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Matt Weber & Armin Sarabi, The Role of Internal Investigations and 
Self-Disclosure in Effective Compliance Programs, COMPLIANCE TODAY, Nov. 2008, at 4. 
196. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 
§ 6002, 124 Stat. 119, 689 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h (2010)).
197. Alan M. Kirschenbaum & David C. Gibbons, 2017: A Banner Year for State
Laws on Drug Pricing, Price Reporting, and Discounting, HYMAN, PHELPS, & MCNAMARA
PC: FDA L. BLOG (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2017/11/2017-a-
banner-year-for-state-laws-on-drug-pricing-price-reporting-and-discounting/ [https: 
//perma.cc/8TD2-3JEW] (describing the recently adopted reporting requirements 
in California and Vermont, among other states); Lydia Ramsey, ‘More is Possible’: A 
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and their departments routinely operate within this complex, 
tangled web of transparency requirements. 
In our estimation, their experience designing and deploying 
processes and technical solutions to meet various physician payment 
transparency requirements makes compliance officers ideally suited 
to address new pricing disclosure schemes. Pharmaceutical 
compliance officers could implement programs by employing the 
following steps currently used in Sunshine Act compliance: 
(1) Determine what information needs to be gathered and 
locate the sources of that information; 
(2) Collect all the information and place it into some type of 
repository; 
(3) Develop and deploy tools to monitor completeness of the 
information and extract the data as required for each 
report; 
(4) Create the necessary quality control, review, and, if 
necessary, attestation process; and 
(5) Establish the necessary processes, complete with timelines 
for each succeeding round of reports. 
Although each step seems simple and obvious on its face, it 
requires an expert’s knowledge of the laws and regulations, the 
industry, and the company’s unique structures, systems, and 
processes to achieve success. This is where compliance officers excel. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As federal, state, and local governments cope with ever higher 
pharmaceutical prices that seem to defy logic and common sense, 
various state and local governments have seized the concept of 
pricing transparency to restore the missing balance. In doing so, they 
are discovering that pharmaceutical pricing is an extremely 
complicated and interdependent system of healthcare providers, 
payors, manufacturers, and patients. Governments continue to 
persist in their efforts after seeing a glimpse of the irrational world 
of drug pricing, knowing that current approaches are untenable. 
Bunch of States are Taking on High Drug Prices, and It Could Start Hitting Drugmaker 
Profits, BUS. INSIDER (June 4, 2017, 3:36 PM), http://www.business 
insider.com/states-with-drug-pricing-transparency-bills-2017-6/ [https://perm 
a.cc/P3EH-U7QP] (discussing pharmaceutical transparency legislation in
Maryland, New York, Nevada, Ohio, California, and Vermont). 
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Likewise, the pharmaceutical industry continues to fight against 
the inevitable tide, arguing that regulators and the public do not 
need to understand how prices are set. Although arguing 
strenuously that additional legislation—including pricing 
transparency—is not the answer to rising costs, the pharmaceutical 
industry and its lobbyists fail to propose alternatives that attempt to 
meet the needs of all constituents. Therefore, without offering a 
plausible alternative, like physician payment transparency, pricing 
transparency will likely become a permanent fixture. 
For industry compliance officers, coping with a radically new 
landscape is something which they are eminently familiar. With 
battle-tested experience and tools, the industry’s compliance officers 
are best suited to demonstrate the value of compliance by helping 
their companies manage the new reality, while minimizing its 
disruptive impacts. They need to have the courage to step to the 
front of the line and lead. 
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